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Abstract: We analyze the effect of Toyota’s faulty accelerator pedal on stockholder wealth. 
Using the event study methodology, we show that a major recall in January of 2010 caused the 
company’s cumulative abnormal returns to fall by 19%. Continued concerns that Toyota was 
unable to identify and adequately fix the problem induced the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration to conduct its own investigation in March, 2010. The results of this government 
investigation exonerated the company and caused Toyota’s cumulative abnormal returns to rise 
by almost 9%. The Toyota case provides an opportunity to study a product recall with both 
company error and a government action that addressed concerns about the safety of the product. 
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There is a saying in business that if a company loses its resources but retains its 
reputation, it can rebuild, but money cannot bring back a company that loses its reputation. To 
build consumer loyalty, a company must offer reliable products at a reasonable price. The 
process of building a reputation for reliability and value can take decades, and a major misstep 
can tarnish a company’s reputation for many years. Product recalls are potential reputation 
harming events. 
Large cross-sectional studies on product recalls (for example see Kini, Shenoy, and 
Subramaniam 2013) suggest that firms experience significant declines in sales, often increase 
advertising to counter the lost reputation, and can use their brand loyalty to offset some of the 
adverse consequences. But the problem with large cross-sectional studies is that the number of 
incidents is so high that the market may be insensitive to many of these frequent events. In fact, 
the market may believe it is just part of the normal business cycle. The sample used by Kini, 
Shenoy, and Subramaniam had 816 events over a five year period, or approximately one recall 
every two and a half days. Others have elected to review a specific industry for more insight. The 
auto industry recalls have been examined by Jarrell and Peltzman (1985), Hoffer, Pruitt and 
Reilly (1988), and Barber and Darrough (1996). The drug industry recalls by Amned, Gardella, 
and Nonda (2002). The food industry recalls by Thomsen and McKenzie (2001).  All find that, in 
general, recall events are value destroying events. But clearly, with an event every two days or 
so, not all recalls are value destroying events. What does it take for a recall to rise to the level 
that it harms the firm? 
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When looking at a firm specific case,  an individual recall might not have a negative 
impact on the company or one that is short-lived. A classic example is Johnson and Johnson’s 
recall of its non-aspirin pain reliever, Tylenol (Dowdell, Govindaraj, and Jain (1992) and 
Mitchell, (1989)). During a three day period beginning September 29, 1982, seven Chicago area 
residents died from taking Extra-Strength Tylenol capsules that had been laced with cyanide. 
This caused the market share of all Tylenol brands to immediately fall from 37 to 7 percent. 
What is interesting is that this event had little long-term effect on Tylenol’s reputation and on 
stockholder wealth. One reason for this is that cyanide was added to the capsules at retail outlets, 
not at Tylenol production facilities. Thus, the poisoning was an exogenous event that was not the 
fault of Johnson and Johnson. Another reason is that the company’s response to the poisonings 
quickly renewed consumer confidence in the Tylenol brand. Once the source of the poison 
became apparent, Johnson and Johnson immediately withdrew all Tylenol capsules from the 
market. In addition, the company repackaged Tylenol capsules with a triple safety seal, a first in 
the industry. As a result, Tylenol’s market share reached 30 percent within six months, and the 
brand returned to its dominant position by August of 1983. 
In this paper, we investigate the financial effect of a major product recall on the stock 
returns of the Toyota Motor Corporation. We select this case because unlike the Tylenol case 
with Johnson and Johnson, the recall was based on internal issues with manufacturing and not 
external issues outside the control of the company. From January 2000 to January 2010, there 
were reports of 52 deaths linked to Toyota vehicles with uncontrolled acceleration (Manning and 
Raum, 2010). This led to recalls in 2007 and in 2010 involving approximately 7.5 million Toyota 
vehicles. At first, there was uncertainty regarding the cause of the problem.  
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Toyota initially announced that the defect was minor in nature, but engineers at the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration were concerned that the problem was due to a 
major design flaw. It was not until early 2011 that a 10-month government study concluded that 
Toyota had appropriately corrected the defect. Thus, the Toyota case provides an opportunity to 
study the effect of four distinct events around the product recall. The initial event is an 
announced investigation by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
following consumer complaints. The second event is a news event surrounding a highway 
fatality linked to the acceleration problem. A third event is the company announcement of a 
design flaw in the accelerator. The fourth event is study released by NHTSA completed by 
NASA engineers that absolved Toyota. By studying these four incidents in a case study format 
we can provide additional insight into when a recall incident may have a negative, long lasting 
impact and when a recall incident may have no impact.  .  
Our goal in this paper is to use a case study of Toyota and the event study method to 
estimate the impact on Toyota’s stock returns of the events related to Toyota’s accelerator pedal 
problems. We want to see if these four events have an impact given the high brand loyalty for 
Toyota, source of the information (public or company release) and if a good outcome (NHTSA 
report) after the fact, can reverse the original negative impact. Our results indicate that all events 
are not the same and products recalls may require special circumstances to elicit a negative 
reaction by the market. Section II discusses the timeline of events. Section III discusses the event 
study method. Section IV describes the data and empirical results. Section V provides 
concluding remarks.  
 
II. Toyota and the Accelerator Pedal Recall 
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 In the first decade of the 21st century, Toyota had grown to be a very successful 
corporation. It became the world’s largest car manufacturer, replacing General Motors. From 
Table 1, one can observe that the operating revenues of Toyota surpassed those of the Ford 
Motor Company in 2005 and General Motors in 2007. Table 2 shows that Toyota had the largest 
U.S. market share in light vehicle sales in 2007 and 2008.1 
 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 About Here] 
 
Problems with Toyota vehicles first became public in March 2007 when the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) began an investigation in response to 
consumer complaints of unintended acceleration in Toyota’s Lexus ES 350 model. Concerns 
with Toyota vehicles escalated because it took so long to identify the source of the problem. The 
scope of the investigation widened after Troy Johnson was killed in July of 2007 when a Toyota 
Camry accelerated out of control, reaching a speed of approximately 120 mph before it hit 
Johnson’s car.2  This event was probably the tipping point that caused the NHTSA to look 
closely at the accelerator problems with Toyota vehicles. After detailed investigations, Toyota 
concluded that the accident was caused by unsecured (rubber all-weather) floor mats that could 
shift forward and trap the accelerator pedal. This led Toyota to recall the all-weather floor mats 
on 55,000 Lexus and Camry models on September 26, 2007. 
On August 28, 2009, Toyota’s reputation was tarnished further when another fatal 
highway accident received a great deal of media attention. Mark Saylor, an off-duty highway 
1 These include cars, sport utility vehicles, and light trucks (pick-up trucks but not heavy trucks). Source: 
Financial Times Lexicon at http://markets.ft.com/research/Lexicon/Term?term=light-vehicle-sales accessed March 
29, 2013 
2 We also investigated the abnormal returns of Toyota following Troy Johnson’s accident but abnormal 
returns were small and insignificant.  
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patrolman, and his family died in the crash of his Lexus ES350. In response, on September 29 of 
2009 Toyota issued a consumer safety advisory that instructed owners of several Toyota and 
Lexus models (2007-2010 Camry, 2005-2010 Avalon, 2004-2009 Prius, 2005-2010 Tacoma, 
2007-2010 Tundra, 2007-2010 Lexus ES350, and 2006-2010 Lexus IS250 and Lexus IS350) to 
remove and not replace their floor mats not replace them until Toyota found a solution. The 
investigation continued, however, as concerns were raised that unsecure floor mats were not the 
sole cause of the accelerator problem. 
On January 21, 2010, Toyota instituted a major recall, admitting that the problem was 
also caused by an accelerator pedal design flaw. As Akio Toyoda, CEO of Toyota, admitted, 
Toyota has, for the past few years, been expanding its business 
rapidly. Quite frankly, I fear the pace at which we have grown may 
have been too quick…. We pursued growth over the speed at 
which we were able to develop our people and our organization…. 
I regret that this has resulted in safety issues described in the 
recalls we face today.3 
 
News of the recall spread quickly, which tarnished Toyota’s reputation for engineering 
excellence. According to the Project for Excellence in Journalism, the Toyota recall was the fifth 
most reported story in the week of January 25-31 and the second most reported story in the week 
of February 1-7, 2010.4   
According to Toyota, the accelerator pedal on certain models suffered from mechanical 
problems. Wear and environmental conditions could cause a nylon friction device to stick and 
prevent the accelerator pedal from returning to idle. Thus, the fix was minor and required only 30 
3 This testimony is available at http://www.toyota.com/about/news/corporate/2010/02/24-1-testimony.html, 
accessed October 2, 2011. 
4 See “On State of the Union Week, It’s All About Obama,” Journalism.org, 
http://www.journalism.org/index_report/pej_news_coverage_index_january_2531_2010 and “With Budget as 
Backdrop, Economy Leads the News,” Journalism.org, at 
http://www.journalism.org/index_report/pej_news_index_report,  accessed October 2, 1011. 
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minutes of mechanic time to complete. Nevertheless, there remained persistent concerns that the 
problem was electronic rather than mechanical in nature. This led the U.S. Congress to request 
that NHTSA continue its investigation of the causes of unintended acceleration of Toyota 
automobiles in March, 2010.5 To complete their investigation, NHTSA enlisted the help of 
NASA engineers. After a 10 month investigation, NHTSA released its study on February 8, 
2011, which concluded that (1) there was no evidence of an electronics flaw, (2) most of the 
accidents were the result of driver error (i.e., drivers stepping on the accelerator instead of the 
brake, called pedal misapplication), and (3) the remaining accidents resulted from problems 
corrected by previous recalls (regarding accelerator entrapment and mechanical defects in the 
accelerator pedal).  
Because these events provide investors with different information, each event is expected 
to have a different effect on Toyota’s stock returns. Corporate error led to recall announcements 
in 2007 and 2010 and would be expected to adversely affect the firm’s stock returns. However, 
recalls are common in the automobile industry. In 2007 alone, NHTSA records indicate that 
there were approximately 7,300 recalls affecting millions of vehicles. Thus, the minor recall of 
2007 that affected only 55,000 Toyota vehicles is likely to have a minor effect relative to the 
2010 recall that involved 2.3 million Toyota vehicles. Given the extensive media coverage that it 
received, the death of Mark Saylor may have had a significant negative effect on Toyota’s 
returns. Finally, when the NHTSA study lifted the cloud of uncertainty surrounding the 
reliability of Toyota automobiles, one might expect that this information substantially lifted 
Toyota’s returns.  
 
5 For a discussion of possible political motives for NHTSA’s continued investigation of Toyota, see 
Ramsey and Mitchell (2010).   
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III. Event Study Analysis 
We use the event study method to appraise the effect of each event on Toyota’s stock 
returns. This methodology was developed by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969). For 
more recent reviews of this method, see Thomson (1985), Armitage (1995), MacKinlay (1997), 
Bhagat and Romano (2002a, 2002b) and Corrado (2011). This method has been widely used to 
study product recalls. Examples include Jarrell and Peltzman (1985), Hoffer et al. (1988), 
Mitchell (1989), Davidson and Worrell (1992) and Govindraj et al. (2004). It is based on the 
market model, which assumes the price of a stock reflects all currently available information in 
the marketplace (xt). In particular, the return of a security, such as stock i at time t (Rit), is a 
function of all available market information, which is typically measured as the market return on 
a large portfolio of stocks (Rmt).6 The market model assumes a stable linear relationship:  
 Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit,       (1) 
           εit ~ N(0, σ2),       
where the error term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 depends on unanticipated random events and is, purely white noise.  
Our goal is to test the null hypothesis that an event such as a product recall has no effect 
on a company’s abnormal returns. An abnormal return is defined as the actual ex post return 
minus the expected return. The normal return equals the expected return, conditional on the event 
never taking place. Formally, the abnormal return for firm i at event date τ is 
 ARiτ = Riτ − E(Riτ|Rmτ),       (2) 
where E(Riτ|Rmτ)  is the expected normal return and Rmτ is the pre-event conditioning 
information for the normal return model. In other words, Rmτ is the information that is used to 
forecast the expected return assuming that the event had never occurred. 
6 In applications, the Standard & Poor 500 Index (S&P Index) is used for the market portfolio.  
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 To successfully measure and analyze abnormal returns, we first need sufficient stock 
price (and dividend) data before and after the event date. Let τ = 0 be the event date and Wpre be 
the pre-event time period or estimation window.7 Let Tpre be the number of observations (days) 
in Wpre. The event window (Wevent) identifies the time it takes for the event information to affect 
returns. In a perfectly efficient financial market, this will be a very short length of time and 
would include just one time period. With real world imperfections, however, there may be 
information leaks before the event and lags in response to the event. With information leaks, 
Wevent starts before τ = 0; if it takes time for investors to evaluate the economic consequences of 
an event, then Wevent extends into several periods after τ = 0.  
 The next step in evaluating the financial effect of an event is to accurately estimate 
expected normal returns. This requires estimation of the market model in equation 1. Under the 
conditions of the model, the parameters can be estimated with data from Wpre using ordinary 
least squares (OLS). Parameter estimates (αi�  and βi� ) and market data from Wevent are used to 
forecast normal returns during the event window, (Riτ|Rmτ). Thus, the abnormal return at time t 
is  
  ARiτ = Riτ − E�R�iτ�Rmτ�.       (3) 
For the classic market model, 
  ARiτ = Riτ − �αi� + βi�Rmτ�.       (4) 
When Wevent includes more than one period, sample abnormal returns are added up to obtain 
cumulative abnormal return, CARiτ. If Wevent ranges from t = τ1 < 0 to t = τ2 > 0, then 
 CARiτ = ∑ ARiττ2t=τ1 .         (5) 
7 When daily return data are used, the pre-event window typically includes 100 to 250 trading days 
(Mackinlay, 1997; Bhagat and Romano, 2002a). A longer period reduces the variance of possible sampling error. 
However, a longer period may capture the effect of previous unexpected abnormal events.    
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This measures the total effect on abnormal returns for a multi-period event window. If the event 
has no effect on the value of the firm, then ARiτ (and CARiτ) will not be significantly different 
from zero, because actual returns will not significantly differ from normal returns. With a 
negative (positive) event, however, both ARiτ and CARiτ will be negative (positive) and 
significantly different from zero. We use parametric and non–parametric tests of these 
hypotheses for the four Toyota events discussed above. 
 Following the classic market model, we can estimate CARs using alternate specifications. 
In another specification, we use the Fama French 3-factor model, regressing stock returns on 
index of market capitalization (SMBmt) and index of value to growth stocks (HMLmt) in addition 
to the S&P 500 market returns. 
 Rit = αi + βiRmt + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + εit   (6) 
 In yet another specification, the 3-factor model is augmented by a momentum factor 
(MOMmt) on winners and losers for the market in addition to SMBmt, HMLmt and Rmt. 
 Rit = αi + βiRmt + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + εit (7) 
To account for risk, we also employ the Capital Asset Pricing Model, which uses the 
correlation of riskiness of a stock to the riskiness of the market to predict AR and CAR. This 
model uses risk free rate (the interest rate on the 1-month treasury bill) in the equation below, 
 Rit = Rft + βi�Rmt −  𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖� +  εit      (8) 
Some Robustness Tests 
1. Traditional Parametric Tests  
 Traditional parametric tests have been discussed in Patell, 1976; Brown and Warner, 1985; 
Salinger, 1992; Mackinlay, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; McWilliams and McWilliams, 
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2000. These tests generally assume that ARit is independently and identically distributed with 
mean zero and variance σ2(ARit). In this case,  
σ2(ARit) =  σ2 �1 + 1Tpre + (Rmt−R�m)2∑ (Rmτ−R�m)2τ∈Wpre �    (9) 
where R�m is the mean of market returns over the estimation window. We assume that the event 
has an effect on the mean only and not the variance of abnormal returns during the event 
window. We can use the distributional properties of abnormal returns to make statistical 
inferences on abnormal returns for the event window. The null hypothesis is that abnormal 
returns are not significantly different from zero during the event window. In order to compute the 
test statistic for abnormal returns, we standardize each daily abnormal return 
  SARiτ =  ARiτ σ(ARiτ)⁄ .       (10) SARiτ follows a t-distribution with Tpre-2 degrees of freedom. This statistic is used to test the 
null hypothesis.  
CARiτ is assumed to be distributed independently and identically with mean zero and 
variance σ2(CARiτ). The variance of CAR on day τ is given by the following expression 
σ2(CARit) =  σ2 �k + k2Tpre + ∑ Rmττ2τ1 −k(R�m)2∑ (Rmτ−R�m)2τ∈Wpre �,    (11) 
Parameter k is the day within the event window. The null hypothesis is that each cumulative 
abnormal return is not significantly different from zero. The test statistic that is used to test the 
null hypothesis above is given by the following expression for standardized cumulative abnormal 
returns (SCAR) 
  SCARiτ =  CARiτ σ(CARiτ)⁄        (12) 
 
2. Nonparametric Rank Test 
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We also use a non-parametric test which dispenses with a distributional assumption for 
abnormal returns. This test was initially developed by Corrado (1989, 2011). It requires that we 
calculate abnormal returns for the event window and arrange abnormal returns in increasing 
order, ranking these returns from one (lowest value) to Tpre (highest value). We define ζiτ as the 
rank of the abnormal return for event day τ. Because ζiτ can vary with equal probability from 1 to 
Tpre, the statistic uiτ = ζiτ1+Tpre follows a discrete uniform distribution. The test statistic is 
constructed as: 
 Zτ =  4.91√m (uiτ0.14 − (1 − uiτ)0.14),      (13) 
where m is the number of firms in the sample (which equals 1 here) and Zτ is close to the 
standard normal distribution even for small values of m. The null hypothesis is that AR for day τ 
is not significantly different from zero. 
 
IV. The Data and Estimation Results 
The raw data include stock prices for Toyota and the market index, measured as the 
Standard & Poor 500 Index (S&P Index), obtained from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP). Returns on the S&P Index are defined as the daily percentage change in the value 
of the S&P Index, and Toyota’s returns are defined as the daily percentage change in the 
Toyota’s stock price (plus dividends per share). We investigate the four events that were 
discussed above.  
Event 1:  the minor floor-mat recall of September 26, 2007 
Event 2:  the Mark Saylor highway accident of August 28, 2009 
 Event 3:  the major recall of January 21, 2010 
 Event 4:  the release of the NHTSA Report of February 8, 2011 
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Details surrounding each event are summarized in Table 3. 
[ Insert Table 3 About Here] 
Dates of the estimation and event windows are presented in Table 4. The estimation 
window equals 250 trading days for events 1 through 3.8 The estimation window for the NHTSA 
Report (event 4) is only 230 days.9 The starting date is March 12, 2010 in order to avoid 
contamination from news associated with the January recall. For example, Toyota’s Chairman 
testified before Congress on February 24, 2010 that the problem was fixed. Thus, the beginning 
of this estimation window began 12 trading days after this testimony. Because each event is 
expected to be unanticipated, the event window begins on the event date (t = 0) and ends 10 
trading days after the event.10  Eleven day event window may be appropriate for the major recall 
because the dissemination of new information about the recall continued for more than a week. 
We consider 11 day event windows for each event.11  Table 5 provides summary statistics of the 
data for each event. During the estimation window for event 1, dividends were paid out on 
December 7, 2006 (79.96 cents) and July 5, 2007 (105.2 cents), for event 2 on December 8, 2008 
(126.03 cents) and July 6, 2009 (67.48 cents), for event 3, dividends were paid out on July 6, 
2009 (67.48 cents per share) and on December 8, 2009 (42.64 cents per share) and for event 4, 
dividends were paid out on December 6, 2010 (44.09 cents) and June 30, 2011 (69.47 cents). No 
dividends were paid out during any event windows. 
8 For the major recall (event 3), we also consider an event window of 79 trading days. This avoids possible 
contamination from the Mark Saylor highway accident. This window starts 20 days after the accident. Whether we 
use a window of 250 or 79 days, the results are essentially the same.  
9 In order to account for a possible change in relationship between Rit and Rmt due to previous events, we 
also used a common estimation window of 250 days which was used for the first event to predict abnormal returns 
and cumulative abnormal returns for all event windows. This did not change the results. We also performed the 
CUSUM test of the hypothesis that there was a structural break during each estimation window. No evidence of a 
structural break was detected. 
10 To account for possible leaks in information related to recall announcements, we also used a 21-day 
event window starting 10 days prior to the event day. We find no evidence of leakage of information in any of the 
four events. These results are presented in Appendix A.  
11 Eight days may be more appropriate for the 2010 recall, because there were rumors of a Prius recall in 
early February (Takahashi and Kachi, 2010).  
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[Insert Tables 4 and 5 About Here] 
OLS parameter estimates of the using data from the event window for each event are 
listed in Table 6.12 In each case, there is a positive and significant association between market 
returns and Toyota returns. Parameter estimates from each model are used to generate estimates 
of abnormal returns and of cumulative abnormal returns for 10 trading days following the event. 
Table 7 presents estimates of the Abnormal Returns (ARs) and the Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CARs). To analyze the null hypothesis that each event had no effect on excess returns, 
we first use parametric tests. For the floor mat recall (event 1), only one AR (day 2) is 
significantly different from zero, but it is positive. None of the CARs are significantly different 
from zero. This result is not surprising, given that minor recalls such as this are common in the 
automobile industry and may have already been factored into company values and returns by 
investors.  
For the Saylor highway accident (event 2), CAR reaches a value of -7 percent by day 10, 
but none of the CARs are statistically significant at 10 percent. Thus, in spite of the considerable 
publicity that this event received, Toyota’s ARs and CARs were not significantly different from 
zero.  
The major recall of 2010 (event 3) had a much greater impact, however. Two ARs (days 
3 and 8) were negative and different from zero at the 1 percent level of significance. AR for day 
7 was negative and significant at 5 percent level. The CARs are negative and are significantly 
different from zero at 1 percent for days 3 through  10. By day eight, CAR fell to 19.09 percent. 
Thus, Toyota lost a substantial amount of market value, suggesting that the event was 
12 We tested for autocorrelation in the model with the S&P 500 Index using the Durbin Watson test, but 
found no evidence of autocorrelation. 
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unanticipated and significant enough to cause investors to believe that this would cause a drop in 
expected future profits. 
The NHTSA Report (event 4) also had a substantial effect on Toyota’s returns. Two ARs 
were positive and significant at 1 percent, while one AR was positive and significant at 10 
percent. Nine CARs are significant at 1 percent, and two are significant at 5 percent. CAR 
reached a peak of 8.7 percent on day six. This suggests that investors were reassured by the 
report that Toyota’s previous recalls had properly corrected its accelerator pedal problem.  
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 About Here] 
Next, we carry out non-parametric rank test for the significance of ARs in each event. 
The test produces results that are consistent with those from the parametric test and are available 
from the authors upon request. To test the robustness of our results, we also estimated excess 
returns using various multifactor models. Each specification produced the same results.  
The empirical results are broadly consistent with our expectations. To visualize this, 
Figure 1 plots the CARS for each event during the event window. Of the three negative events 
(events 1-3), the major recall had the greatest negative impact on Toyota’s returns. The NHTSA 
Report of 2011 led to substantially higher returns. This suggests that the report lifted the cloud of 
suspicion regarding the safety of Toyota automobiles. It also demonstrates how a government 
ruling in a product recall case can reduce market uncertainty and influence corporate returns.  
[Insert Figure 1 About Here] 
V. Concluding Remarks 
The damage to a company’s reputation may be far greater from an event that is caused by 
management error than from a negative exogenous event. Investors understand that external 
events are outside the control of the firm and are a part of the normal course of business. On the 
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other hand, investors are likely to punish companies more severely for management error, as it 
implies a deficient management team and corporate structure. 
We estimate the extent to which accelerator pedal recalls affected the financial returns of 
the Toyota Motor Corporation. These involve a minor (floor mat) recall in 2007 and a major 
recall in 2010 to fix a mechanical problem with accelerator pedals on many Toyota models. 
Because of lingering concerns that Toyota had not adequately fixed the problem, NHTSA 
continued its investigation, which culminated in a formal report in February of 2011. We also 
estimate the financial impact of this report on Toyota’s returns. 
The evidence supports three conclusions. First, the 2007 minor recall had no significant 
effect on Toyota’s returns and illustrates that not all recalls are harmful to the firm but rather 
normal business. Second, the negative news event of the highway crash did not have a significant 
impact on share prices. Apparently it was not clear that the crash was in fact the result of design 
problems with the automobile. Third, the 2010 recall that involved 7.5 million vehicles and had 
acknowledgement from the company of a potential design flaw had a significant impact on 
Toyota’s returns with a negative 19 percent change. Fourth, investors appear to place a high 
value on information that derives from unbiased experts. For Toyota, the cloud of uncertainty 
regarding the safety of its accelerator pedals was lifted once the NHTSA report confirmed that 
Toyota had corrected the problem. This confirmation had a significant and positive impact on 
Toyota’s returns by almost 9 percent.  
The questions now become, what additional information beyond the product recall itself 
is necessary for a harmful impact to a firm? Can a subsequent major news release following the 
recall on the potential problems illicit a negative reaction by the market? And, what role does 
18 
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Table 1:  Operating Revenues by Company ($, Million) 
 
 
Company 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 
 
Ford 170,064 176,896 160,123 172,455 146,277 118,308 128,954 
 
General Motors 180,557 190,215 207,349 181,122 148,979 104,589 135,592 
 
Hondaa 52,170 84,338 94,310 119,801 100,971 91,854 107,985 
 
Nissana 49,110 80,584 88,717 108,405 85,093 80,485 106,006 
 
Toyotaa 106,030 179,083 202,864 262,394 208,995 202,901 229,503 
 
Source: Standard and Poor’s Automotive Sector Report, 2011 





Table 2:  Market Share of New Light Vehicle Sales in the U.S. 
 
 Year Toyota General Ford Honda Other Foreign 
  Motors                         Manufacturersa 
 
 2007 19.9 19.6 11.0 11.6 16.1 
 
 2008 19.9 18.5 10.5 12.9 17.4 
 
 2009 19.5 16.2 11.7 13.0 20.6 
 
 2010 17.1 14.3 12.4 12.3 23.3 
 
 2011 14.7 15.6 11.9 10.0 26.4 
 
Source: Standard and Poor’s Automotive Sector Report, 2011 
aThese include BMW, Hyundai, Kia, Mercedes/Daimler, and Volkswagen. 
 
 
Table 3:  Important Events Associated with Toyota’s Accelerator Pedal Problems 
 
 





 Event 1 September 26, 2007 55,000 Toyota Camry and Lexus ES350 vehicles 
were involved in an all-weather floor mat recall. 
 
 Event 2 August 28, 2009 Mark Saylor, an off-duty highway patrolman and 
his family die in a crash of Lexus ES350 because 
the accelerator was stuck to the floor mat. 
 
 Event 3 January 21, 2010 2.3 million vehicles (Camry, Corolla, RAV4, 
Matrix, Avalon, Highlander, Tundra, Sequoia) 
were recalled due to sticking accelerator pedals. 
This was in addition to a recall of 4.2 million 
vehicles to reduce entrapment of accelerator pedal 
by floor mat. 1.7 million vehicles were involved in 
both cases. 
 
 Event 4 February 8, 2011 NHTSA and NASA complete their study on 
electronic causes of unintended acceleration issues 
with Toyota vehicles and conclude that no 





Table 4:  Estimation and Event Windows for Four Events with 11 Days in Event Window   
 
 
 Event Estimation Window   Event Window 
  Date from-to (number of days) Date from-to (number of days) 
 
 
 Event 1 09/27/2006 – 09/25/2007 (250 days) 09/26/2007 – 10/10/2007 (11 days)  
 
 Event 2 09/02/2008 – 08/27/2009 (250 days) 08/28/2009 – 09/14/2009 (11 days) 
 
 Event 3  01/23/2009 – 01/21/2010 (250 days) 01/22/2010 – 02/05/2010 (11 days) 
 








Table 5:  Summary Statistics for the Four Events 
 
 
   Variable  Description N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
    (×102)   (×102) (×102) (×102) 
 
 
Event 1          Rit  returns from Toyota stock 250  0.0350 1.1346 -3.4261 3.7683 
          Rmt  returns from S&P 500 index 250  0.0542 8.2573 -3.4725 2.9208 
        
Event 2          Rit  returns from Toyota stock 250  0.0457 3.4204     -16.5236  14.1708 
          Rmt  returns from S&P 500 index 250 -0.0466 2.8605       -9.0350  11.5800 
        
Event 3          Rit  returns from Toyota stock 250  0.1683 2.0612 -5.4822 7.8878 
          Rmt  returns from S&P 500 index 250  0.1309 1.6292 -4.9121 7.0758 
        
Event 4           Rit  returns from Toyota stock 230  0.0517 1.2455 -2.8524 2.9449 










Table 6:  Regression Results for the Four Events 
 
 
 Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 
 
 
Dependent Rit Rit Rit Rit 
Variable     
 
Intercept  -0.0001  0.0009  0.0006  0.0001 
 (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0006) 
 
     
Rmt  0.7888a  0.9627a  0.8605a  0.7149a 
 (0.0714) (0.0450) (0.0589) (0.0561) 
 
     
N 250 250 250 230 
 
𝑅𝑅�2 0.3268 0.6468 0.4604 0.4133 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 7:  Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Events 1-4 
 
 Event 1 Event 2 













 (SAR) (SCAR) (SAR) (SCAR) 
0 -0.0077 -0.0077 -0.0050 -0.0050 
 (-0.830) (-0.724) (-0.245) (-0.246) 
1 0.0056 -0.0021 -0.0055 -0.0105 
 (0.6020) (-0.143) (-0.272) (-0.369) 
2 0.0212b 0.0191 0.0136 0.0031 
 (2.277) (1.112) (0.666) (0.089) 
3 0.0058 0.0249 -0.0027 0.0004 
 (0.615) (1.170) (-0.132) (0.009) 
4 -0.0041 0.0208 -0.0235 -0.0231 
 (-0.439) (0.894) (-1.153) (-0.510) 
5 -0.0141c 0.0067 -0.0024 -0.0256 
 (-1.510) (0.271) (-0.120) (-0.510) 
6 -0.0002 0.0065 -0.0104 -0.0359 
 (-0.022) (0.243) (-0.509) (-0.660) 
7 0.0044 0.0109 -0.0151  -0.0510 
 (0.471) (0.373) (-0.740) (-0.873) 
8 0.0000 0.0109 0.0155 -0.0355 
 (-0.002) (0.357) (0.760) (-0.571) 
9 -0.0196b -0.0087 -0.0172 -0.0527 
 (-2.098) (-0.268) (-0.842) (-0.802) 
10 -0.0131c -0.0218 -0.0171 -0.0698 






Table 7, Continued 
 
 
 Event 3 Event 4 
 January 2010 Major Recall 














 (SAR) (SCAR) (SAR) (SCAR) 
0 -0.0064 -0.0064 0.0374a 0.0374a 
 (-0.419) (-0.516) (3.908) (3.655) 
1 -0.0097 -0.0161 0.0139c 0.0513a 
 (-0.641) (-0.805) (1.455) (3.740) 
2 -0.0075 -0.0237 -0.0096 0.0417a 
 (-0.497) (-0.950) (-1.006) (2.475) 
3 -0.0855a -0.1092a 0.0099 0.0515a 
 (-5.638) (-3.696) (1.031) (2.595) 
4 -0.0167 -0.1259a 0.0289a 0.0804a 
 (-1.100) (-3.850) (3.023) (3.610) 
5 -0.0007 -0.1266a 0.0040 0.084a 
 (-0.048) (-3.547) (0.417) (3.500) 
6 0.0254b -0.1013a 0.0031 0.0875a 
 (1.669) (-2.560) (0.326) (3.314) 
7 -0.0337b -0.1350a -0.0047 0.0828a 
 (-2.221) (-3.136) (-0.492) (2.921) 
8 -0.0558a -0.1909a -0.0041 0.0787a 
 (-3.679) (-4.186) (-0.429) (2.613) 
9 0.0030 -0.1879a -0.0123 0.0664b 
 (0.194) (-3.990) (-1.277) (2.165) 
10 0.0378a -0.1501a -0.0014 0.0650b 




Appendix A:  Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Events 1-4, 
Twenty One Day Event Window 
 
 Event 1 Event 2 
 Floor Mat Recall Highway Accident 
 Day Abnormal Cumulative Abnormal Cumulative  
  Return Abnormal Return Abnormal 
   Return  Return 
  (SAR) (SCAR) (SAR) (SCAR) 
 -10  -0.0010    0.0138    0.0056    0.0264 
  (-0.104) (-0.104)  (0.276)  (0.282) 
 -9  -0.0135c    0.0002  -0.0014    0.0250 
  (-1.457) (-0.983) (-0.069)  (0.152) 
 -8    0.0070    0.0072    0.0150    0.0400 
   (0.754) (-0.430)  (0.736)  (0.552) 
 -7  -0.0003    0.0069    0.0015    0.0415 
  (-0.031) (-0.407)  (0.072)  (0.509) 
 -6  -0.0144c  -0.0075  -0.0022    0.0393 
  (-1.512) (-0.897) (-0.107)  (0.403) 
 -5    0.0103    0.0028  -0.0313c    0.0080 
   (1.107) (-0.440) (-1.530) (-0.251) 
 -4    0.0041    0.0070  -0.0072    0.0008 
   (0.446) (-0.277) (-0.354) (-0.364) 
 -3  -0.0058    0.0012    0.0067    0.0075 
  (-0.625) (-0.451)  (0.329) (-0.225) 
 -2    0.0008    0.0019    0.0025    0.0101 
   (0.083) (-0.412)  (0.125) (-0.171) 
 -1    0.0060    0.0079  -0.0051    0.0050 
   (0.645) (-0.209) (-0.249) (-0.239) 
 0  -0.0079    0.0000  -0.0050    0.0000 
  (-0.854) (-0.429) (-0.245) (-0.300) 
 1    0.0055    0.0055  -0.0056  -0.0056 
   (0.589) (-0.258) (-0.273) (-0.364) 
 2    0.0213b    0.0268    0.0135    0.0079 
   (2.293)  (0.324)  (0.661) (-0.171) 
 3    0.0054    0.0321  -0.0027    0.0052 
   (0.576)  (0.443) (-0.133) (-0.199) 
 4  -0.0041    0.0280  -0.0235  -0.0183 
  (-0.444)  (0.328) (-1.150) (-0.481) 
 5  -0.0140c    0.0140  -0.0024  -0.0207 
  (-1.508) (-0.018) (-0.119) (-0.493) 
 6  -0.0003    0.0137  -0.0104  -0.0310 
  (-0.033) (-0.025) (-0.507) (-0.596) 
 7    0.0041    0.0178  -0.0151  -0.0461 
   (0.441)  (0.069) (-0.738) (-0.745) 
 8    0.0000    0.0178    0.0155  -0.0306 
   (0.003)  (0.068)  (0.759) (-0.556) 
 9  -0.0199b  -0.0020  -0.0172  -0.0478 
  (-2.136) (-0.359) (-0.841) (-0.722) 
 10  -0.0131c  -0.0151  -0.0171  -0.0649 
  (-1.408) (-0.625) (-0.839) (-0.878) 
ap<0.01, bp<0.05, cp<0.10.  
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Appendix A, Continued 
 
 Event 3 Event 4 
 January 2010 Major Recall Release of NHTSA Document 
 Day Abnormal Cumulative Abnormal Cumulative  
  Return Abnormal Return Abnormal 
   Return  Return 
  (SAR) (SCAR) (SAR) (SCAR) 
 -10  -0.0160  -0.0886    0.0041  -0.0378 
  (-1.022) (-0.995)  (0.434)  (0.432) 
 -9    0.0208c  -0.0678  -0.0217b  -0.0595 
   (1.331)  (0.213) (-2.303) (-1.270) 
 -8    0.0034  -0.0644    0.0134c  -0.0461 
   (0.219)  (0.298)  (1.424) (-0.247) 
 -7    0.0461a  -0.0182b  -0.0133c  -0.0594 
   (2.943)  (1.729) (-1.405) (-0.972) 
 -6  -0.0108  -0.0290    0.0046  -0.0548 
  (-0.689)  (1.223)  (0.488) (-0.615) 
 -5    0.0172  -0.0118c    0.0016  -0.0532 
   (1.100)  (1.553)  (0.172) (-0.466) 
 -4    0.0114  -0.0004b    0.0224a  -0.0307 
   (0.726)  (1.724)  (2.376)  (0.429) 
 -3  -0.0039  -0.0043c  -0.0055  -0.0362 
  (-0.248)  (1.507) (-0.579)  (0.203) 
 -2  -0.0174  -0.0217  -0.0012  -0.0374 
  (-1.108)  (1.067) (-0.132)  (0.149) 
 -1    0.0278b    0.0061c    0.0000  -0.0374 
   (1.769)  (1.581)  (0.003)  (0.141) 
 0  -0.0061    0.0000c    0.0374a    0.0000 
  (-0.388)  (1.405)  (3.962)  (1.258) 
 1  -0.0094  -0.0094    0.0139c    0.0139c 
  (-0.598)  (1.164)  (1.473)  (1.612) 
 2  -0.0072  -0.0166  -0.0096    0.0043 
  (-0.460)  (0.990) (-1.017)  (1.282) 
 3  -0.0852a  -0.1017    0.0099    0.0142c 
  (-5.437) (-0.492)  (1.049)  (1.491) 
 4  -0.0164  -0.1181    0.0289a    0.0432b 
  (-1.046) (-0.745)  (3.064)  (2.179) 
 5  -0.0004  -0.1185    0.0040    0.0471b 
  (-0.026) (-0.729)  (0.422)  (2.215) 
 6    0.0258c  -0.0928    0.0032    0.0503b 
   (1.643) (-0.307)  (0.335)  (2.212) 
 7  -0.0333b  -0.1261  -0.0047    0.0456b 
  (-2.127) (-0.787) (-0.494)  (2.035) 
 8  -0.0555a  -0.1816c  -0.0041    0.0416b 
  (-3.543) (-1.560) (-0.431)  (1.886) 
 9    0.0032  -0.1784c  -0.0124c    0.0292c 
   (0.204) (-1.488) (-1.303)  (1.589) 
 10    0.0381a  -0.1402  -0.0014    0.0277c 
   (2.435) (-0.925) (-0.151)  (1.525) 





Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Toyota for Four Events Over Eleven day Event 
Window 
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